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Abstract. A collaboration network is a graph formed by communica-
tion channels between parties. Parties communicate over these channels
to establish secrets, simultaneously enforcing interdependencies between
the secrets. The paper studies properties of these interdependencies that
are induced by the topology of the network. In previous work, the au-
thors developed a complete logical system for one such property, inde-
pendence, also known in the information flow literature as nondeducibil-
ity. This work describes a complete and decidable logical system for the
functional dependence relation between sets of secrets over a collabo-
ration network. The system extends Armstrong’s system of axioms for
functional dependency in databases.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study properties of interdependencies between pieces of infor-
mation. We call these pieces secrets to emphasize the fact that they might be
unknown to some parties. Below, we first describe two relations for expressing in-
terdependencies between secrets. Next, we discuss these relations in the context
of collaboration networks which specify the available communication channels
for the parties establishing the secrets.
1.1 Relations on Secrets
One of the simplest relations between two secrets is functional dependence, which
we denote by a B b. This means that the value of secret a reveals the value of
secret b. This relation is reflexive and transitive. A more general and less trivial
form of functional dependence is functional dependence between sets of secrets.
If A and B are two sets of secrets, then ABB means that, together, the values
of all secrets in A reveal the values of all secrets in B. Armstrong [1] presented
the following sound and complete axiomatization of this relation:
1. Reflexivity: ABB, if A ⊇ B,
2. Augmentation: ABB → A,C BB,C,
3. Transitivity: ABB → (B B C → AB C),
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where here and everywhere below A,B denotes the union of sets A and B. The
above axioms are known in database literature as Armstrong’s axioms [2, p. 81].
Beeri, Fagin, and Howard [3] suggested a variation of Armstrong’s axioms that
describe properties of multi-valued dependency.
Not all dependencies between two secrets are functional. For example, if se-
cret a is a pair 〈x, y〉 and secret b is a pair 〈y, z〉, then there is an interdependency
between these secrets in the sense that not every value of secret a is compatible
with every value of secret b. However, neither aB b nor bB a is necessarily true.
If there is no interdependency between two secrets, then we will say that the two
secrets are independent. In other words, secrets a and b are independent if any
possible value of secret a is compatible with any possible value of secret b. We
denote this relation between two secrets by a ‖ b. This relation was introduced by
Sutherland [4] and is also known as nondeducibility in the study of information
flow. Halpern and O’Neill [5] proposed a closely related notion called f -secrecy.
Like functional dependence, independence also can be generalized to relate
two sets of secrets. If A and B are two such sets, then A ‖ B means that any con-
sistent combination of values of the secrets in A is compatible with any consistent
combination of values of the secrets in B. Note that “consistent combination”
is an important condition here, since some interdependency may exist between
secrets in set A even while the entire set of secrets A is independent from the
secrets in set B. A sound and complete axiomatization of this independence
relation between sets was given by More and Naumov [6]:
1. Empty Set: ∅ ‖ A,
2. Monotonicity: A,B ‖ C → A ‖ C,
3. Symmetry: A ‖ B → B ‖ A,
4. Public Knowledge: A ‖ A→ (B ‖ C → A,B ‖ C),
5. Exchange: A,B ‖ C → (A ‖ B → A ‖ B,C).
The assumption A ‖ A in the Public Knowledge axiom guarantees that each
secret in the set A has a fixed value and, thus, is “public knowledge”. Details
can be found in the original work [6]. Essentially the same axioms were shown
by Geiger, Paz, and Pearl [7] to provide a complete axiomatization of the inde-
pendence relation between sets of random variables in probability theory.
A complete logical system that combines the independence and functional
dependence predicates for single secrets was described by Kelvey, More, Naumov,
and Sapp [8]:
1. Reflexivity: aB a,
2. Transitivity: aB b→ (bB c→ aB c),
3. Symmetry: a ‖ b→ b ‖ a,
4. Universal Independence: a ‖ a→ a ‖ b,
5. Universal Dependence: a ‖ a→ bB a,
6. Substitution: a ‖ b→ (bB c→ a ‖ c),
where a, b and c, unlike A,B and C above, stand for single secrets, not sets of
secrets.
1.2 Secrets in Collaboration Networks
So far, we have assumed that the values of secrets are determined a priori. In
the physical world, however, secret values are often generated, or at least dis-
seminated, via interaction between several parties. Quite often such interaction
happens over a fixed network. For example, in social networks, interaction be-
tween nodes happens along connections formed by friendship, kinship, financial
relationship, etc. In distributed computer systems, interaction happens over com-
puter networks. Exchange of genetic information happens along the edges of the
genealogical tree. Corporate secrets normally flow over an organization chart.
In cryptographic protocols, it is often assumed that values are transmitted over
well-defined channels. On social networking websites, information is shared be-
tween “friends”. Messages between objects on an UML interaction diagram are
sent along connections defined by associations between the classes of the objects.
We attempt to capture this type of information flow over a graph by the
notion of a collaboration network. Such a network consists of several parties
connected by communication channels that form a network with a fixed topology.
A pair of parties connected by a channel uses this channel to establish a secret. If
the pairs of parties establish their secrets completely independently from other
pairs, then possession of one or several of these secrets reveals no information
about the other secrets. Assume, however, that secrets are not picked completely
independently. Instead, each party with access to multiple channels may enforce
some desired interdependency between the secrets it shares with other parties.
These “local” interdependencies between secrets known to a single party may
result in a “global” interdependency between several secrets, not all of which
are known to any single party. Given the fixed topology of the collaboration
network, we study what global interdependencies between secrets may exist in
the system.
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Fig. 1. Collaboration network N1.
Consider, for example, the collaboration network N1 depicted in Figure 1.
Suppose that the parties collaborate according to the following protocol. Party
P picks a random value a from {0, 1} and sends it to party Q. Party Q picks
values b and c from {0, 1} in such a way that a = b + c mod 2 and sends both
of these values to R. Party R computes d = b + c mod 2 and sends value d to
party S. In this protocol, it is clear that the values of a and d will always match.
Hence, for this specific protocol, we can say that a B d, but at the same time
a ‖ b and a ‖ c.
Note that in the above example, all channels transmit secret messages in
one direction and, thus, the channel network forms a directed graph. However,
in the more general setting, two parties might establish the value of a secret
through a dialog over their communication channel, with messages traveling in
both directions. Thus, in general, we will not assume any specific direction on a
channel.
1.3 Data Streams and Collaboration Networks
In this section, we will consider a more sophisticated example of collaboration
network from network coding theory.
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Fig. 2. Butterfly network N2.
Network coding studies methods of attaining maximum information flow in a
network where channels have limited throughput. A standard example of network
coding is given in terms of the butterfly network [9] depicted in Figure 2 as N2.
Suppose that parties P and Q generate streams of 1-bit messages a1, a2, . . .
and b1, b2, . . . , respectively, with rate one message per second. They need to
transmit both sequences of messages to both S and T using only the available
communication channels. Each channel’s throughput is one bit per second. Note
that any protocol over N2 that attempts to independently transmit streams of
messages {ai}i and {bi}i will fail due to the limited combined capacity of the
three channels connecting parties P , Q, and R, with parties S, T , and U .
The desired result, however, can be easily achieved by a “network coding”
protocol that combines the two streams. Under this protocol, at time 1, party
P transmits bit a1 to both S and R. At the same time, party Q transmits bit
b1 to both T and R. At time 2, party R already possesses bits a1 and b1, so can
compute the bit a1 + b1 mod 2 and send it to U . At time 3, party U forwards
this bit to S and T . Note that party S received bit a1 directly from party P ,
and after receiving a1 +b1 mod 2 from U one second later, S can reconstruct the
value of b1, since
a1 + (a1 + b1) ≡ b1 (mod 2).
Similarly, party T receives b1 directly from Q, and can reconstruct the Boolean
value a1 after receiving the sum from U . For each time i > 1, the propagation
of bits ai and bi is carried out in a similar fashion.
The coding protocol described above can be viewed as a protocol over a col-
laboration network if the whole stream of messages sent over a single channel
in the coding network is interpreted as a single message in the collaboration
network. The computation rules of the coding protocol are viewed as the lo-
cal conditions of the collaboration network. For example, if the notation mXY
denotes the entire secret value shared between parties X and Y , and [mXY ]i
denotes its i-th bit, then, for example, the local condition at party R can be
described as
∀i ≥ 1 ([mRU ]i+1 ≡ [mPR]i + [mQR]i (mod 2)) .
The desired properties of the protocol can be stated in our notation as
mPS ,mUS BmQR,mPR
and
mQT ,mUT BmQR,mPR.
Other network protocols that deal with data streams, such as, for example, the
alternating bit protocol [10], can similarly be interpreted in terms of collabora-
tion networks.
1.4 Network Topology
The independence and functional dependence examples we have given so far
are for a single protocol, subject to a particular set of local interdependencies
between secrets. If the topology remains fixed, but the protocol is changed, then
secrets which were previously functionally dependent may no longer be so, and
vice versa. For example, for network N1 above, the claim a B d will no longer
be true if, say, party R switches from enforcing the local condition d = b + c
mod 2 to enforcing the local condition d = b. In this paper, we study properties
of relations between secrets that follow from the topological structure of the
network of channels, no matter which specific protocol is used, as long as it is
specified in terms of interdependencies between adjacent channels. Examples of
such properties for network N1 are (aB d)→ (b, cB d) and (a ‖ b, c)→ (a ‖ d).
In an earlier work [11], we gave a complete axiomatic system for the indepen-
dence relation between single secrets over a collaboration network. In fact, we
axiomatized a slightly more general relation a1 ‖ a2 ‖ · · · ‖ an between multiple
single secrets. One can also consider collaboration networks in which a secret
is known to any arbitrary subset of parties, rather than a pair of parties. In
a recent paper [12], we generalized the earlier independence results [11] to this
“hypergraph” setting.
In this article, we turn our attention to functional dependence in (non-
hypergraph) collaboration networks. Here, we present a sound and complete
logical system that describes the properties of the functional dependence relation
ABB between sets of secrets over any fixed network topology N . This system in-
cludes Armstrong’s Reflexivity, Augmentation, and Transitivity axioms. To these,
we add a Gateway axiom. The above-mentioned statement (aB d)→ (b, cB d)
is an instance of this new axiom for network N1. We prove additional statements
about different collaboration networks in Section 5.
From the point of view of verification of a specific protocol, the logical calculus
introduced in this paper allows us to separate arguments about properties of the
protocol itself from the topological properties of the underlying network. For
example, since (aB d)→ (b, cB d) is a property of network N1, if the designers
of a particular cryptographic protocol over N1 can guarantee that the value of
d can not be reconstructed from the values of b and c, then using the axioms of
our logical system, one can prove that the value of d is not revealed by the value
of a for the same protocol.
2 Formal Setting
Throughout this paper, we assume a fixed infinite alphabet of variables a, b, . . . ,
which we refer to as “secret variables”. By a network topology, we mean a finite
graph whose edges, or “channels”, are labeled by secret variables. We allow loop
edges and multiple edges between the same pair of parties. The set of all channels
of network N will be denoted by Ch(N). One channel may have (finitely) many
labels, but the same label can be assigned to only one channel. Given this, we
will informally refer to “the channel labeled with a” as simply “channel a”.
Definition 1. A semi-protocol over a network N is a pair 〈V,L〉 such that
1. V (c) is an arbitrary set of “values” for each channel c ∈ Ch(N),
2. L = {Lp}p∈P is a family of predicates, indexed by set P of all parties of
the network N , which we call “local conditions”. If c1, . . . ck is the list of all
channels incident with party p, then Lp is a predicate on V (c1)×· · ·×V (ck).
Definition 2. A run of a semi-protocol 〈V,L〉 is a function r such that
1. r(c) ∈ V (c) for any channel c ∈ Ch(N),
2. If c1, . . . ck is the list of all channels incident with a party p ∈ P , then
predicate Lp(r(c1), . . . , r(ck)) is true.
Definition 3. A protocol is any semi-protocol that has at least one run.
The set of all runs of a protocol P is denoted by R(P).
Definition 4. A protocol P = 〈V,L〉 is called finite if the set V (c) is finite for
every c ∈ Ch(N).
We conclude this section with the key definition of this paper. It is the defi-
nition of functional dependence between sets of channels.
Definition 5. A set of channels A = {a1, . . . , an} functionally determines a set
of channels B = {b1, . . . , bk}, with respect to a fixed protocol P, if
∀r, r′ ∈ R(P)
∧
i≤n
r(ai) = r
′(ai)→
∧
j≤k
r(bj) = r
′(bj)
 .
We find it convenient to use the notation f ≡X g if functions f and g are
equal on every argument from set X. Using this notation, we can say that a set
of channels A functionally determines a set of channels B if
∀r, r′ ∈ R(P) (r ≡A r′ → r ≡B r′).
3 Language of Secrets
By Φ(N), we denote the set of all properties of secrets in collaboration network
N definable through the predicate A B B. More formally, Φ(N) is a minimal
set of formulas defined recursively as follows: (i) for any two finite sets of secret
variables (labels of channels in network N) A and B, formula ABB is in Φ(N),
(ii) the false constant ⊥ is in set Φ(N), and (iii) for any formulas φ and ψ ∈
Φ(N), the implication φ→ ψ is in Φ(N). As usual, we assume that conjunction,
disjunction, and negation are defined through → and ⊥.
Next, we define a relation  between a protocol and a formula from Φ(N).
Informally, P  φ means that formula φ is true under protocol P.
Definition 6. For any protocol P over a network N , and any formula φ ∈
Φ(N), we define the relation P  φ recursively as follows:
1. P 2 ⊥,
2. P  A B B if the set of channels A functionally determines set of channels
B under protocol P,
3. P  φ1 → φ2 if P 2 φ1 or P  φ2.
In this paper, we study the formulas φ ∈ Φ(N) that are true under any protocol
P over fixed network N . Below we describe a formal logical system for such
formulas. This system, like earlier systems defined by Armstrong [1], More and
Naumov [13, 11, 12] and by Kelvey, More, Naumov, and Sapp [8], belongs to the
set of deductive systems that capture properties of secrets. In general, we refer
to such systems as logics of secrets. Since this paper is focused on only one such
system, here we call it the Logic of Secrets. Before stating the axioms of the
Logic of Secrets, we need one more technical definition.
By a path in a network, we mean any undirected path in the graph formed
by the channels of the network. We say that a set of channels G is a gateway
between sets of channels A and B if any path from A to B goes through G. We
state this more formally below:
Definition 7. Let A, B, and G be any three sets of channels in Ch(N). Set G
is a gateway between sets A and B if for any path (c1, . . . , cn) in network N ,
c1 ∈ A ∧ cn ∈ B →
∨
1≤i≤n
ci ∈ G. (1)
Note that in the above definition sets A, B, and G are not necessarily disjoint.
Thus, for example, for any set A ⊆ Ch(N), set A is a gateway between A and
itself. Also, note that the empty set is a gateway between any two components
of the network that are not connected to one another.
4 Axioms
For a fixed collaboration network N , the Logic of Secrets, in addition to propo-
sitional tautologies and the Modus Ponens inference rule, contains the following
axioms:
1. Reflexivity: ABB, if A ⊇ B,
2. Augmentation: ABB → A,C BB,C,
3. Transitivity: ABB → (B B C → AB C),
4. Gateway : A B B → G B B, if G is a gateway between sets A and B in
network N .
Recall that the first three of these axioms were introduced by Armstong [1],
and they are known in database theory as Armstrong’s axioms [2, p. 81]. The
soundness of all four axioms will be shown in Section 6.
We use the notation X `N Φ to state that formula Φ is derivable from the
set of formulas X in the Logic of Secrets for network N .
5 Examples of Proofs
We will give three examples of proofs in the Logic of Secrets. Our first example
refers to square collaboration network N3 depicted in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Network N3.
Proposition 1. `N3 (aB c) ∧ (bB d)→ (aB d) ∧ (bB c).
Proof. Due to the symmetry of the network, it is sufficient to show that (a B
c) ∧ (b B d) → a B d. Note that {a, c} is a gateway between sets {b} and {d}.
Thus, by the Gateway axiom, bB d implies (a, cB d). On the other hand, by the
Augmentation axiom, the assumption aB c yields (aB a, c). By the Transitivity
axiom, (aB a, c) and (a, cB d) imply aB d. uunionsq
For the second example, consider the linear network N4 shown in Figure 4.
Q RbP Sa c T Ud e
Fig. 4. Network N4.
Proposition 2. `N4 (aB d) ∧ (eB c)→ bB c.
Proof. We begin with the assumption that eB c. Since {d} is a gateway between
sets {e} and {c}, by the Gateway axiom, dB c. Next, using the assumption that
aB d, the Transitivity axiom yields aB c. Finally, we note that {b} is a gateway
between {a} and {c}, and apply the Gateway axiom once again to conclude that
bB c. uunionsq
Note that the second hypothesis in the example above is significant. Indeed,
imagine a protocol on N4 where V (d) = {0}, the set of values allowed on all other
channels is {0, 1}, and the local condition at each party p is simply Lp ≡ true.
In this protocol, a B d since the value of a on any run clearly determines the
(constant) value of d. However, the value of b is of no help in determining the
value of c, so the conclusion bB c does not hold.
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Fig. 5. Network N4.
As our final example, we prove a property of hexagonal collaboration network
N5 shown in Figure 5.
Proposition 3. `N5 (a1, a2 B a3) ∧ (a2, a3 B a1) ∧ (a3, a1 B a2) → b1, b2, b3 B
a1, a2, a3.
Proof. Note that {b1, b3} is a gateway between sets {a2, a3} and {a1}. Thus, by
the Gateway axiom, (a2, a3 B a1) → (b1, b3 B a1). Hence, by the assumption,
(a2, a3Ba1), we have that (b1, b3Ba1). Similarly one can show that (b1, b2Ba2)
and (b2, b3 B a3) using the assumptions (a3, a1 B a2) and (a1, a2 B a3).
Consider statements (b1, b3 B a1) and (b1, b2 B a2). By the Augmentation
axiom, they, respectively, imply that (b1, b2, b3Ba1, b1, b2) and (a1, b1, b2Ba1, a2).
Thus, by the Transitivity axiom, (b1, b2, b3 B a1, a2).
Now consider (b1, b2, b3B a1, a2) and statement (b2, b3B a3), established ear-
lier. By the Augmentation axiom, they, respectively, imply that (b1, b2, b3 B
a1, a2, b2, b3) and (a1, a2, b2, b3 B a1, a2, a3). Thus, by the Transitivity axiom,
(b1, b2, b3 B a1, a2, a3). uunionsq
6 Soundness
In this section, we demonstrate the soundness of each of the four axioms in the
Logic of Secrets.
Theorem 1 (Reflexivity). P  ABB, for any protocol P and any B ⊆ A.
Proof. Consider any two runs r, r′ ∈ R(P) such that r ≡A r′. Thus r ≡B r′ for
any B ⊆ A. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Augmentation). P  ABB → A,C BB,C, for any protocol P
and any sets of channels A, B, and C.
Proof. Assume P  A B B and consider any two runs r, r′ ∈ R(P) such that
r ≡A,C r′. By our assumption, r ≡B r′. Therefore, r ≡B,C r′. uunionsq
Theorem 3 (Transitivity). P  ABB → (BBC → ABC), for any protocol
P and any sets of channels A, B, and C.
Proof. Assume P  ABB and P  B B C. Consider any two runs r, r′ ∈ R(P)
such that r ≡A r′. By the first assumption, r ≡B r′. By the second assumption,
r ≡C r′. uunionsq
Theorem 4 (Gateway). P  A B B → G B B, for any protocol P and any
gateway G between sets A and B.
Proof. Assume P  A B B and consider any two runs r1, r2 ∈ R(P) such that
r1 ≡G r2. We will show that r1 ≡B r2. Consider the network N ′ obtained by
removing from N all channels in set G. By the definition of a gateway, no single
connected component of network N ′ can contain channels from set A \ G and
set B \G at the same time. Let us divide all connected components of N ′ into
two subgraphs N ′A and N
′
B such that N
′
A contains no channels from B \G and
N ′B contains no channels from A \G. Components that do not contain channels
from either A \G or B \G can be arbitrarily assigned to either N ′A or N ′B .
Next, define a function r on each c ∈ Ch(N) as follows:
r(c) =
 r1(c) if c ∈ N
′
A,
r1(c) = r2(c) if c ∈ G,
r2(c) if c ∈ N ′B .
We will prove that r is a run of protocol P. We need to show that r satisfies
the local conditions of protocol P at each party p. The connected component of
N ′ containing a party p either belongs to N ′A or N
′
B . Without loss of generality,
assume that it belongs to N ′A. Thus, Inc(p), the set of all channels in N incident
with party p, is a subset of Ch(N ′A)∪G. Hence, r ≡Inc(p) r1. Therefore, r satisfies
the local condition at party p simply because r1 does.
By the definition of r, we have r ≡A r1 and r ≡B r2. Together, the first of
these statements and the assumption that P  ABB imply that r ≡B r1. Thus,
due to the second statement, r1 ≡B r ≡B r2. uunionsq
7 Completeness
In this section, we demonstrate that the Logic of Secrets is complete with respect
to the semantics defined above. To do so, we first describe the construction of a
protocol called P0, which is implicitly parameterized by a collaboration network
N and a set X of formulas in Φ(N).
7.1 Protocol P0
Throughout this section, we will assume that N is a fixed collaboration network,
and X ⊆ Φ(N) is a fixed set of formulas.
Definition 8. For any A ⊆ Ch(N), we define A∗ to be the set of all channels
c ∈ Ch(N) such that X `N AB c.
Theorem 5. A ⊆ A∗, for any A ⊆ Ch(N).
Proof. Let a ∈ A. By the Reflexivity axiom, `N AB a. Hence, a ∈ A∗. uunionsq
Theorem 6. X `N ABA∗, for any A ⊆ Ch(N).
Proof. Let A∗ = {a1, . . . , an}. By the definition of A∗, X `N A B ai, for any
i ≤ n. We will prove, by induction on k, that X `N (A B a1, . . . , ak) for any
0 ≤ k ≤ n.
Base Case: X `N AB∅ by the Reflexivity axiom.
Induction Step: Assume that X `N (A B a1, . . . , ak). By the Augmentation
axiom,
X `N A, ak+1 B a1, . . . , ak, ak+1. (2)
Recall that X `N A B ak+1. Again by the Augmentation axiom, X `N (A B
A, ak+1). Hence, X `N (ABa1, . . . , ak, ak+1), by (2) and the Transitivity axiom.
uunionsq
We now proceed to define our protocol P0. We will first specify the set of
values V (c) for each channel c ∈ Ch(N). In this construction, the value of each
channel c on a particular run will be a function from the set 2Ch(N) into the set
{0, 1}. Thus, for any c ∈ Ch(N) and any E ⊆ Ch(N), we have r(c)(E) ∈ {0, 1}.
We will find it more convenient, however, to think about r as a two-argument
Boolean function, where r(c, E) ∈ {0, 1}.
Furthermore, we will not allow the value of a channel on a particular run to
be just any function from the set 2Ch(N) into {0, 1}. Instead, for any channel c,
we will restrict set V (c) so that, for any run r, if c ∈ E∗, then r(c, E) = 0.
To complete the description of protocol P0, we will specify the local condi-
tions for each party in the network. At each party p, we define the local condition
Lp as
∀E ⊆ Ch(N) ∀c, d ∈ (Inc(p) \ E∗) (r(c, E) = r(d,E)) .
That is, when two channels are incident with a party p and neither channel is in
E∗, the values of the functions assigned to those channels on argument E must
match on any given run.
To show that P0 is indeed a protocol, we only need to show that it has at
least one run. Indeed, the constant function r(c, E) = 0 trivially satisfies the
local condition at every party p.
Now that the definition of protocol P0 is complete, we make the following
two claims about its relationship to the given set of formulas X.
Theorem 7. If P0  ABB, then X `N ABB.
Proof. Assume P0  A B B and consider two specific runs of P0. The first of
these two runs will be the constant run r1(c, E) = 0. The second run is defined
as
r2(c, E) =
{
1 if c /∈ A∗ and E = A,
0 if c ∈ A∗ or E 6= A. (3)
To show that r2 satisfies the local condition at a party p, consider any E ⊆
Ch(N) and any c, d ∈ Inc(p) \ E∗. If E 6= A, then r2(c, E) = 0 = r2(d,E). If
E = A, then, since c, d ∈ Inc(p) \ E∗, we have c, d /∈ A∗. Thus, r2(c, E) = 1 =
r2(d,E). Therefore, r2 is a run of protocol P0.
Notice that by Theorem 5, A ⊆ A∗. Thus, by equality (3), r2(a,E) = 0 for
any a ∈ A and any E ⊆ Ch(N). Hence, r1(a,E) = 0 = r2(a,E) for any a ∈ A
and E ⊆ Ch(N). Thus, by the assumption that P0  ABB, we have r1(b, E) =
r2(b, E) for any b ∈ B and E ⊆ Ch(N). In particular, r1(b, A) = r2(b, A) for
any b ∈ B. Since, by definition, r1(b, A) = 0, we get r2(b, A) = 0 for any b ∈ B.
By the definition of r2, this means that B ⊆ A∗. By the Reflexivity axiom,
`N A∗ BB. By Theorem 6 and the Transitivity axiom, X `N ABB. uunionsq
Theorem 8. If X `N ABB, then P0  ABB.
Proof. Assume that X `N ABB, but P0 2 ABB. Thus, there are runs r1 and
r2 of P0 such that r1(a,E) = r2(a,E) for any a ∈ A and any E ⊆ Ch(N), but
there is b0 ∈ B and E0 ⊆ Ch(N) such that
r1(b0, E0) 6= r2(b0, E0). (4)
First, assume that network N ′, obtained from N by the removal of all channels
in set E∗0 , contains a path pi connecting channel b0 with a channel a0 ∈ A. Thus,
this case implicitly assumes that b0, a0 /∈ E∗0 . Let functions f1 and f2 on the
channels of network N be defined as f1(c) = r1(c, E0) and f2(c) = r2(c, E0). Due
to the local conditions of protocol P0, all channels along path pi must have the
same value of function f1. The same is also true about function f2. Therefore,
r1(b0, E0) = f1(b0) = f1(a0) = r1(a0, E0) = r2(a0, E0) = f2(a0) = f2(b0) =
r2(b0, E0). This is a contradiction with statement (4).
Next, suppose that there is no path in N ′ connecting b0 with a channel in A.
Thus, set E∗0 is a gateway between sets A and {b0}. By the Gateway axiom,
`N AB b0 → E∗0 B b0. (5)
By the Reflexivity axiom, `N BB b0. Recall the assumption X `N ABB. Thus,
by the Transitivity axiom, X `N ABb0. Taking into account (5), X `N E∗0 Bb0.
By Theorem 6, ` E0BE∗0 . Hence, again by Transitivity, X `N E0Bb0. Thus, by
Definition 8, b0 ∈ E∗0 . Hence, by the definition of protocol P0, r(b0, E0) has value
0 for any run r. Therefore, r1(b0, E0) = 0 = r2(b0, E0). This is a contradiction
with statement (4). uunionsq
7.2 Main Result
Now, we are ready to finish the proof of completeness.
Theorem 9. If 0N φ, then there is a finite protocol P such that P 2 φ.
Proof. Assume 0N φ. Let X be a maximal consistent set of formulas such that
¬φ ∈ X. Consider the finite protocol P0 parameterized by network N and set of
formulas X. We will show that for any formula ψ, X `N ψ if and only if P0  ψ
by induction on the structural complexity of formula ψ. The base case follows
from Theorems 7 and 8. The induction case follows from the maximality and
consistency of set X. To finish the proof of the theorem, select ψ to be ¬φ. uunionsq
Corollary 1. Binary relation `N φ is decidable.
Proof. This statement follows from the completeness of the Logic of Secrets with
respect to finite protocols and the recursive enumerability of all theorems in the
logic. uunionsq
8 Conclusion
We have presented a complete axiomatization of the properties of the functional
dependence relation over secrets on collaboration networks. In light of previous
results capturing properties of the independence relation in the same setting [11],
it would be interesting to describe properties that connect these two predicates
on collaboration networks.
An example of such a property for the network N6 in Figure 6 is given in the
following theorem.
Q RbP Sa c
Fig. 6. Network N6.
Theorem 10. For any protocol P over network N6,
P  (a, bB c) ∧ (a ‖ b)→ bB c.
Proof. For any two runs r1, r2 ∈ R(P) where r1(b) = r2(b), we must show that
r1(c) = r2(c). The assumption a ‖ b guarantees that values r1(a) and r2(b)
coexist in some run in R(P); call this run r3. Thus, we have r3(a) = r1(a) and
r3(b) = r2(b).
Next, we create a new function r4 which “glues” together runs r3 and r2 at
party Q. Formally, we define r4 as
r4(x) =
{
r3(x) if x = a,
r2(x) if x ∈ {b, c}.
We claim that function r4 satisfies the local conditions of protocol P, since
at each party in N5, it behaves locally like an existing run. Indeed, at party
P , r4 matches run r3, and at parties R and S, r4 matches run r2. At party Q,
r4 matches r2 exactly, since r4(b) = r2(b). Thus, r4 ∈ R(P). To complete the
proof, we note that r1(a) = r3(a) = r4(a) and r1(b) = r2(b) = r4(b). By the
assumption that (a, b B c), we have r1(c) = r4(c). The definition of r4 is such
that r4(c) = r2(c), so r1(c) = r2(c), as desired. uunionsq
A complete axiomatization of properties that connect the functional depen-
dence relation and the independence relation between secrets on a collaboration
network remains an open problem.
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